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The global financial crisis results from three factors: overly expansionary US 
monetary policy; inappropriate financial deregulation; and a financial panic 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  Asia is now experiencing a 
serious downturn as the result of falling consumption and exports, and an 
intensifying credit squeeze due to global deleveraging.  Through appropriate 
monetary, financial, and public-investment policies, Asia can lead the world 
to recovery, in essence by replacing the declining consumption spending with 
increased public spending on critical goods and services (such as health and 
education) and public investments in sustainable infrastructure, including 
pollution control, sustainable energy systems, efficient water use, broadband 






Thank you for the warm introduction. I imagine that this wonderful turnout 
has very little to do with me, and everything to do with the topic of how we are 
going to get out of this global financial crisis.  This is a crucial and challenging 
topic, especially since nobody yet knows the answers!  
 
While I did not believe we would find ourselves in a crisis this deep, I did 
believe that the United States (US) was quite miserably managed for many years.  
As a general principle, one can assume that chronic mismanagement will lead to a 
crisis. Even so, I was of the view—which is now disproved -- that America’s 
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crisis could be to a substantial extent decoupled from the rest of the world. I 
believed, for example, that Asia would escape any significant downturn, protected 
by its $4 trillion of foreign exchange reserves, its current account surplus, 
relatively healthy fiscal policies, relatively healthy banking policies across the 
region; along with many important targets of opportunity for productive 
investments.  
 
In fact, there is no deep reason for Asia to experience a significant 
downturn. When I thought about that during the past year I said, "Well, since 
there is no reason for a deep downturn, Asia therefore won’t experience a 
significant downturn." Yet Asia is experiencing a significant downturn right now, 
and one that is probably worse than in the official forecasts. Still, stubborn as I 
am, I continue to believe that there is no reason for such adverse outcomes to 
occur. There are policies, still largely untapped, which can buffer the Asian 
economies.  I’ll summarize it this way: Asia can, and should, lead the rest of the 
world out of the crisis, starting in the second half of 2009. 
 
My real concern today, therefore, is to try to understand what more can be 
done in policy terms within Asia. The US and Europe will follow their own 
policies.  There will certainly be some scope for cooperation, but the US is 
currently preoccupied internally with its own politics and debates. Without much 
international cooperation right now, it is going to have to be an Asian-led effort 
within Asia. 
  
My continuing position is that with the current account surplus and cash-
rich economies in this region, Asia should escape a significant downturn. In what 
follows, I will explain this point of view and identify what I think are the missing 
pieces that could be put in place to stop what otherwise is a continuing downward 
spiral on the world scene right now.  
 
 
II. ROOTS OF THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
This global financial crisis clearly has, as its epicenter, the US. As a 
Manhattanite I know the epicenter is actually about two miles from where I live: 
Wall Street.  When the Asian crisis hit almost twelve years ago, the Americans 
came and preached about all the things wrong with Asia. At the time some of you 
may recall that I said that does not sound right. First of all Asia is not as bad as 
Americans say, so the Asian crisis is exaggerated—it is really a panic, not a deep-
rooted crisis.  Moreover, much of what the US was complaining about—of crony 
capitalism and so forth—turned out to be very much an American phenomenon. 
 
So I guess the preachers knew it when they saw it, but at the time the 
theory was the US is great and others should just follow what America does, and 
that Asia’s all bad and that if Asia would just behave a little bit more like the US, 
ACHIEVING GLOBAL COOPERATION ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
AND LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 3 
everything will be fine. We now see that this was not a very accurate description 
at the time and not a very accurate description about the nature of institutions.  
 
Looking back I think we can say that the US—especially the Federal 
Reserve (Fed)—played the central role in all the major bubbles in recent years. 
Policies from the Fed have been destabilizing, i.e., swinging from one bubble to 
the next. I also think we have a case of “instrument instability”, which is turning 
the dials so hard on policy to avoid one crisis that you set up the next crisis, and 
then turning the dials even more the other way, which then sets up yet another 
crisis. So we have actually had three bubbles in a decade.  
 
The Asian bubble was partly the result of very expansionary US monetary 
policy combined with unregulated international capital flows. When the Asian 
crisis hit, the Fed eased policy, and that helped to create the Dot.com bubble. 
When that burst the Fed eased policy again, and especially after September 11, 
ratcheted up monetary expansion that created the third bubble in a decade, this 
time the subprime and mortgage-backed-security bubble.  
 
The underlying condition of this present crisis is essentially a very 
expansionary monetary policy combined with an expansionary fiscal policy in the 
US for most of the past 25 years. The US has refused to tax itself adequately, but 
has liked to spend; and has therefore veered between modest and large budget 
deficits almost continuously except for a few years at the end of the 1990s, when 
tax revenues were bulging with capital gains taxes built on the Dot.Com bubble.   
 
The US has been spending well beyond its means at the national level, by 
about 5–6 percent of gross national product (GNP) per year, reflecting chronic 
budget deficits and low or negative household saving rates. Household saving fell 
to historically low levels as of the late 1990s, backed up by soaring asset prices 
stoked by easy Fed policies.  Households borrowed against rising housing prices 
and assumed that easy credit (whether for credit-card purchases, home-equity 
loans, home mortgages, or auto loans) would always be available. These are the 
roots of the US-made bubble.  This easy-credit period led to a sense of wellbeing 
for a number of years, which started to peak around 2006 when housing prices 
reached a peak value before it started to decline.  
 
All of this was aided and abetted by financial market deregulation, lax 
oversight, and no small amount of corruption and fraud.  Leverage ratios of the 
investment banks, which formed a veritable unregulated “shadow banking 
industry,” were up to 30-to-1 or even 50-to-1.  The most famous case is nearly 
laughable if it weren’t so tragic for so many.  Bernie Madoff, the infamous Ponzi-
scheme investment manager, mishandled tens of billions of dollars without being 
detected by the Federal authorities.  Even more astounding, if news reports are to 
be believed, he did so without engaging in a single actual trade for many years, 
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perhaps more than a decade.  (The facts, however, are yet to emerge in court, 
however).   
 
I think all of this is now pretty much conventionally understood. What was 
the big surprise and puzzle to me is how this percolated to the rest of the world, 
given that much of this description vis-à-vis the US was pretty clear 2 or 3 years 
ago. I remember distinctly conversations where I said that yes, the US would have 
a recession because we have been living beyond our means; and yes, there will 
have to be a correction, but no, it won’t bring down the world economy.  To my 
mind, thinking back a couple of years, these did not add up to the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression.  
 
One part of this story that I only fully appreciated after the fact is that the 
very easy credit policy of the Federal Reserve - which was at the root of the crisis 
- was mimicked by enough of the rest of the world that bubbles developed in a lot 
of places. I also had not fully appreciated that the bubbles were even more in the 
equity markets than in the housing markets.  The worldwide total rise and then 
collapse of equity wealth is astounding.  Stock-market capitalizations around the 
world increased by perhaps $30 trillion during the period 2003 to 2007, before 
collapsing by around $30 trillion by early 2009.  Housing bubbles probably added 
an up-and-down of another $10-$15 trillion.  These asset bubbles were mainly the 
product of US monetary ease being replicated abroad, through one of three 
mechanisms: pegged exchange rates, leading to a massive flow of capital from the 
US to the rest of the world (heavily through inter-bank transmission lines) stoking 
foreign exchange reserve accumulation and soaring high-powered money outside 
of the US; dirty floating matched by forex interventions to slow currency 
appreciations vis-à-vis the US dollar; or capital inflows from the US that 
produced stock market increases but without significant increases in the domestic 
money supplies.   
 
 The collapse of wealth worldwide, of perhaps $40 trillion (adding stock 
markets and housing), and in the US alone of $15 trillion or so, is the main cause 
of the dramatic collapse of consumer spending, or at least is the main cause of the 
first-round effects.  The typical rule of thumb is that each dollar of decline of 
wealth leads to a cut of consumption of between 5 cents and 8 cents.  A 
worldwide decline of $40 trillion, therefore, would cause a worldwide 
consumption decline of $2 - $3.2 trillion dollars.  With a Gross World Product 
(GWP) of around $55 trillion, this amounts to roughly 4 to 6 percent of global 
GDP.  And that’s the direct effect.  It gets multiplied in feedback loops, both 
through the collapse of income that comes with the decline in spending and 
through the impact on bank balance sheets and the availability of loans.  
 
 It is probably the case that the collapse in equity and housing prices was 
driven not only by an inevitable reversal of the preceding bubble, but also by the 
frightening run-up of oil and food prices last year.  This run-up of essential 
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resource prices also underscored for the world the long-term challenges to global 
economic growth.  For a long time it had seemed relatively straightforward for the 
world to achieve four or even five percent per annum global growth, and no doubt 
the exuberant equity markets were pricing in such optimistic expectations.  Then 
we were reminded that conventional energy supplies and even food supplies are 
more precarious than we had assumed.  Conventional oil production is probably 
reaching peak conditions within the next 10-20 years, and some believe that the 
peak has already been reached.  Food production is also struggling to keep up 
with rising populations and rising staples intake per person as the demand for 
meat rises with incomes (raising the demands for feed grains).  The implications 
of marking down the estimated long-term global growth rate from say 4.5 percent 
to 3 percent per annum can be enough to cut worldwide equity market 
capitalization very sharply.  If dividends are discounted at say 6 percent, then 
stock prices vary inversely with 6 minus growth.  A drop from 4.5 percent to 3 
percent would then entail a halving of stock market capitalization.     
 
 
III. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL FALL-OUT: THE FINAL STRAW 
 
All of the foregoing explains the world is experiencing a significant 
slowdown.  It still, however, does not yet add up to calamity. There are more 
things that have happened that we need to take note of.  
 
The most important thing to add to this is that the end of the bubble 
produced not only a decline of wealth, and not only an end to the exaggerated 
investments in the housing sector and consumer purchases, but also a very deep 
financial crisis, starting in the US but then spreading to the rest of the world. The 
crisis resembles in many basic ways the financial crisis and deleveraging that took 
place in Asia during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis.  
 
We know that the banking sector is prone to runs and panics, yet we have 
tended to believe that “modern scientific management” of risk and banking has 
brought such runs and panics to an end.  Yet we now find ourselves in a rip-
roaring financial panic and massive global deleveraging.  What went wrong?  
Bank runs and panics are prevented by a trilogy of policy tools: capital adequacy 
standards, lender-of-last resort facilities of the central bank, and deposit 
insurance.  Yet in the US, all three of these apply only to commercial banks, not 
to investment banks or other kinds of financial intermediaries.  And outside of the 
US, the coverage of even mainstream banks by these three policy tools is uneven 
and sometimes non-existent.  The Wall Street firms created a “shadow banking 
system” outside of the regulatory framework of the commercial banks, and 
therefore subject to runs and panics.  Even the poor regulation of the commercial 
banks left them exposed to crisis, though it is true that the crisis began outside of 
the regulated commercial banks.   
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Hence, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, 
and others, were allowed by the regulators to grow a full shadow banking sector 
that was dependent on very short-term loans from money market funds and other 
investors seeking high liquidity and higher returns than in commercial banks.  
The Wall Street firms bought up mortgages (and consumer loans), packaged them 
into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and then chopped them up in 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  They also held a portion of the MBSs and 
CDOs on their own account, funded by borrowing short term from the money 
markets. The Wall Street shadow banking system did not have any of the 
protections of the commercial banks.  They were over-leveraged, lacked direct 
support from the Fed, and were not protected by deposit insurance.  The huge 
regulatory mistake, therefore, was to ignore all of the controls that had been put in 
place on the commercial banks over the course of the past century to forestall 
panics.  Bear Stearns maintained funds that had leverage of 35-to-1 for example.  
The Wall Street firms were exposed, and ended up in collapse when the credit 
bubble burst.  
 
The Fed had actually taken the shocking view that it was fine to have an 
unregulated financial system, forcing Alan Greenspan to acknowledge last fall 
that he had detected a “flaw” in his support for a self-regulated financial system.  
Some flaw, $30 trillion dollars in loss after the fact!  The whole shadow banking 
system began to unravel after the middle of 2006, when Fed monetary policies 
tightened and defaults began on the subprime mortgages that had featured 
prominently in the shadow banking system.  The mortgage-backed securities and 
CDOs built on them started to lose value quickly, and several Wall Street firms 
quickly ran into deep crisis, reflecting the loss of asset values coupled with the 
enormous leveraging of the banks’ balance sheets. Bear Stearns had to close down 
some funds early on, and then one after another of the major investment firms 
revealed their own off-balance-sheet “Structured Investment Vehicles” (SIVs), 
which were designed to borrow short in order to buy MBSs and other risky assets.   
 
These SIVs quickly faced redemptions and difficulty in borrowing new 
funds.  The mortgage-backed-securities market thereby started to collapse, and 
this by itself led to a significant decline in new housing starts, and thereby to a 
fall in housing prices as well as a rise in unemployment. Credit to the housing 
sector first slowed and then eventually stopped. Housing prices fell even faster as 
credit flows dried up, and the fall of housing prices accelerated the retreat from 
new home financing.  Since the SIVs were so leveraged, they were threatened 
imminently by insolvency.  
 
As the system unraveled completely between the middle of 2006 and the 
middle of 2008, the SIVs went bankrupt, were closed, or were taken on to the 
balance sheet of the main financial houses. None existed beyond 2008. That 
meant that several percent of GNP and of credit flow that had been supporting 
housing construction disappeared. Of course, the commercial banks could not 
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make up the difference in mortgage lending and also did not want to make up the 
difference because of the rising foreclosure rates and declining house prices. This 
downward spiral at was a big part of the deepening of the US crisis.  
 
By the middle of 2008, one could already figure out that the US recession 
would be more than just a mild recession. One could see that other parts of the 
world were going to be caught up in this because their own housing bubble had 
burst and because their stock prices had declined. My sense is that even 
retrospectively it did not have to be a calamity, nor does it have to be a calamity 
now. Unfortunately, in that famous weekend of September 12–15, panic hit the 
world’s financial system with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the collapse 
and emergency government rescue of AIG, and the desperate sale of Merrill 
Lynch to Bank of America, backed by taxpayer dollars. 
  
Looking back, it is clear that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers was really 
the coup de grace that set us off to a very deep global downturn, complete with 
plunging stock markets and an ongoing financial panic still not resolved till today. 
After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, one of America’s 
money market funds, Reserve Primary Fund, declared the next day that it would 
have to “break the buck” on its deposits.  It could not meet the dollar par value of 
its money market deposits, but would redeem accounts at 97 cents per dollar.  
This in turn triggered one of the greatest panics in financial history, and surely the 
greatest in terms of the absolute decline in worldwide wealth. 
  
There was a sudden and nearly complete withdrawal of money-market 
lending to the commercial banking system in the US, a cessation of nearly all 
interbank loans, a massive withdrawal of loans by American and European banks 
on all lines of credit from abroad, and a drying up of the industrial commercial 
paper market. Even the most blue chip and established commercial and industrial 
firms could no longer roll over short-term paper. What resulted was a liquidity 
crisis that was the most severe ever seen in the world since the Great Depression. 
Very much like the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis when it was impossible to get 
short-term financing, the deleveraging was immediate and fierce, but this time not 
restricted to a region but enveloping the global financial system.  
 
Lehman Brothers should not have been allowed to go into bankruptcy the 
way it did. This was meant to be a demonstration of “toughness” by the Fed, to 
show that moral hazard would be avoided by taking the tough decision not to bail 
out every bank.  It was similar in motivation to the policy of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in Indonesia in November 1997 when it insisted that the 
Indonesia’s shutter several weak banks, thereby triggering a nationwide banking 
panic, and exacerbating Asia’s regional crisis. The IMF’s action destroyed the 
Indonesian economy overnight.  The Fed’s action led to a collapse of short-term 
financial markets and stock markets around the world.   
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In the end, the moral hazard lessons are the opposite of what was intended, 
since after Lehman, the US and other governments have devoted trillions of 
dollars to bank bailouts.  As short-term lending ceased, and deleveraging became 
nearly worldwide, governments responded with blank bailouts.  Within a month, 
around $2 trillion of guarantees were suddenly thrown in place in Europe, US, 
parts of Asia, and parts of Latin America.  By then, the combination of the wealth 
effect, the panic, the decline of equity prices, the decline of housing prices, and 
the complete drying up of consumer credit had led to a worldwide utter collapse 
of consumer spending and investment spending. We do not yet know the depths, 
but my guess is that consumer spending in the US will fall by around 10 percent, 
perhaps more, and therefore by around 7 percent of 2008 GDP. Worldwide the 
decline in consumption spending might amount to 5 percent of 2008 GNP.  
Moreover, industrial investment is also clearly plummeting, both because demand 
for products has collapsed and because credit is not available.  
 
This is being transmitted worldwide partly through the financial sector, 
partly through trade, and partly through the drying up of direct investment 
projects which have been eliminated in the downturn. Up to this point, it seems to 
me that Asia has felt the crisis in essentially the three ways that I identified. First, 
there has been some decline of the housing values in parts of Asia, but probably 
not enough to really lead to a region-wide recession. Second, there have been very 
sharp declines of stock market prices, which have a wealth effect and investment 
effect, and probably are big enough to result in a significant decline of economic 
growth—although again, probably not enough to throw the whole region into a 
serious and prolonged crisis. Third, there has been an abrupt withdrawal of credit 
lines from abroad, as in 1997, which has particularly affected a few economies, 
the Republic of Korea perhaps being the most notable. Korea had something like 
$150 billion of interbank short-term liabilities, a lot of which is being abruptly 
withdrawn.  
 
The sum total of these effects – exports, consumption decline, and 
deleveraging by international banks – has added up to a significant economic 
downturn, much greater than I would have imagined.  Now is the time that Asia 
must deploy its vast resources – in human skills, technology, manufacturing 
prowess, current account surplus, and financial reserves – to fight off the 
recessionary forces.  I turn to this policy challenge next.  
 
V. FILLING THE MISSING PIECES IN ASIA  
 
Let me bring you back to where my thinking was a half a year ago, that is, 
to an Asia with roughly $4 trillion in reserves, current account surpluses, and 
booming economies, especially the PRC's.  Based on these strengths, it ought to 
be possible to fend off recession coming from abroad, although we now know 
better that much of the recession is coming from home base as well in the decline 
of stock market and housing prices. Still, I think there is a lot of room to maintain 
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growth in Asia. However that is not going to be fulfilled under the current policy 
mix. So, what should the new policies be?  
 
First, countries that are seeing a withdrawal of international credits should 
accommodate those withdrawals through the deployment of their own reserves.  
Mechanically, this means extending domestic credit lines from the central bank to 
companies (especially banks) that are seeing their international credits withdrawn. 
If the central bank expands credit to replace the loss of international credits, and 
does so while pegging the exchange rate, the loss of international bank lines will 
be substituted by a decline of foreign exchange reserves at the central bank.  The 
commercial banks will still have forex liabilities, but now to their own central 
bank rather than to foreign commercial banks.  
 
It seems, however, that countries are hoarding their reserves in this 
"dangerous" period, rather than spending down the reserves that would allow 
them to make up for the loss of international bank loans.  Korea’s own reserves, 
which are about $250 billion, should be enough to protect against the withdrawals 
of international credits, but Korea must accept the need to run them down 
partially.  Korea’s willingness to do so can be bolstered, I will emphasize in a 
moment, with “backstopping” support of the neighboring central banks.    
 
The second thing that is happening that I find troubling is Japan’s monetary 
response to this crisis. The repatriation of Yen loans – the unwinding of the so-
called “carry trade,” has appreciated the yen significantly. We know from Japan’s 
modern experience that when the yen reaches levels of 90-95 yen per dollar, 
Japan has a significant crisis in its real economy, of course especially the export-
oriented manufacturing companies.  I would have expected that the Bank of Japan 
would have intervened in the foreign exchange market to prevent the yen from 
appreciating so strongly. Putting a brake on the appreciation of one’s currency is 
an easy thing to do, since it simply involves buying the foreign currency with the 
domestic currency, which after all is in unlimited supply to the central bank. The 
reluctance of the Bank of Japan to do this is a huge puzzle to me because the 
government is saying how worried it is about the yen appreciation. Further, I do 
not think it is in America’s interest to see the yen as strong as 90 or so, if this 
leads to a collapse of the Japanese economy. So it seems to me that even though 
interest rates are very low in Japan, Japanese monetary policy is not expansionary 
enough right now. By buying dollars and selling yen it would be possible to keep 
the yen at around 100 yen to the dollar. This would prevent the collapse of the 
Japanese economy, which is already under way right now.  
 
When you see a country that has a current account surplus, a trillion dollars 
of reserves, an appreciation of its currency, and a collapsing economy, the 
situation does not “add up.”  I can understand why Japan does not want to expand 
fiscal policy because it has not had a great experience with domestic fiscal 
expansion. The public debt is at quite a high level of GNP. The public 
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infrastructure does not need massive upgrading.  Yet monetary policy is not 
similarly constrained.  Japan could weaken the exchange rate, or it could use its 
financial power to support other countries, and thereby to strengthen its own 
economy.  
 
Specifically, Japan could expand monetary policy very significantly right, 
and thereby backstop other countries of Asia. One of the things I would consider 
highly advisable would be massive currency swaps among the central banks of 
Asia.  The Bank of Japan could provide, in effect, massive low-interest yen loans 
to its neighbors, especially the ones in financial distress. Most importantly it 
seems to me that Japan should be making yen reserves readily available to Korea 
and the ASEAN countries in huge amounts.  That would give those countries the 
means to replace the loss of credits from European and US banks (especially 
European banks, quantitatively), and it would have the second advantage of 
inducing a modest depreciation of the yen. Japan probably will not get out of this 
global financial crisis through domestic expansion, but it could get out through 
export more goods and services to the rest of Asia, especially to China. This 
would be greatly facilitated if yen loans are easily available in these other 
countries to support their currencies, banks, and specific investment projects.  
 
That brings me to my final observation, which is that most fundamentally, 
the world is experiencing a steep drop of consumption right now and needs to 
compensate with a sharp increase in public investments. The drop of consumption 
occurred because consumers and their banks got ahead of reality in housing prices 
and equity prices, in mortgage loans, etc, and now there is a brutal reversal which 
will last for years in the form of reduced wealth. So what does macroeconomics 
tell us? If aggregate demand is falling because of a decline of consumption, we 
have to find alternatives to maintain full employment and efficient use of 
resources. One way could be to bolster consumer demand some other way or to 
try to recreate these bubbles. This is not a good idea because households (at least 
in the US) are heavily indebted, and should actually save for a while.  In any 
event, it’s probably not even possible to induce households to consume much 
more.  They are rightly shocked and in the mood to rebuild their savings balances.   
 
Two other ways to expand demand are through government consumption 
and through investment spending (both public and private). Private investment, 
however, is unlikely to make up for the loss of consumption spending. As private 
consumption goes down, we will see much less corporate investment as well in 
the consumer goods industries and in the basic industries that feed them.  I do not, 
therefore, believe that corporate investment is likely to lead the way out of this 
crisis.  It seems to me, therefore, that the most likely way out will be to rely 
heavily on public-sector spending, specifically on the government provision of 
services in health, education, and housing; and on public investments, especially 
infrastructure investment in pollution control, roads, power, ports, conservation 
areas, broadband connectivity, water and sanitation, and other infrastructure areas.  
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Asia needs all of that infrastructure investment desperately. This is still the 
region of the world with the fastest urbanization and the most dramatic needs for 
air pollution control, for cleaning up the energy sector and making it sustainable, 
for cleaning up the lakes and rivers, and for sustainable urban development. 
Hence, public spending has a very high social return and also has a very high 
macroeconomic purpose right now, if it can be financed in a responsible way. 
Therefore, finding ways to bolster aggregate demand largely through government 
investments in priority areas is the most appropriate policy response (in addition 
to ending the financial panic).  
 
With the strengthening yen, there is no limit to Japan’s ability to fund such 
investments throughout Asia, and thereby to bolster demand for Japanese 
construction firms, machinery, design, and indirectly, upstream industrial 
production. Since Japan is very reluctant to expand its own domestic public 
investments (after a decade of high infrastructure spending), it can expand other 
countries’ government investments by providing long-term, yen-backed 
financing, either bilaterally or through the Asian Development Bank.  In this way, 
the world’s second largest economy would help the region to increase the levels 
of government spending on critical, long-term sustainable development programs, 
including sustainable energy, pollution control, public housing, roads, ports, 
urbanization, and other big-ticket investment items. In macroeconomic terms, 
such investments could offset the declines of export earnings from the US and 
Europe and the homegrown declines in consumption spending.   
 
There are huge investments needed that are hugely worthwhile in societal 
terms to bolster Asia’s long-term sustainability. The region does not face an 
overall balance of payments constraint, inflation constraint, or even credit 
constraint (given the massive holdings of foreign exchange reserves). I would 
therefore like to view this global financial crisis as an opportunity to invest in 
public goods around the world. The public sector is chronically under-invested 
compared to private consumption. The US is the worst case of this, since public 
investment has been lagging for decades. There is also a huge backlog of public 
goods that are needed in Asia. The health sector and the education sector have too 
low investment. The energy sector needs to be fundamentally overhauled, and 
pollution control needs to be put in place in the world’s most densely populated 
and polluted regions.  
 
I would like to add one more very important thing to the recommended 
policy mix: Asia could finance a lot of investment goods for Africa as well. This 
is an interest of mine because Africa is the poorest and least capitalized part of the 
whole world, with a disastrously poor infrastructure.  As a region, Africa needs 
power plants, roads, ports, and agricultural renovation. These are all things that 
Asia knows how to do very well.  Rather than letting the factories sit empty, these 
goods should be sold to Africa as well, on favorable financial terms for the poor 
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countries of Africa (meaning on the basis of low-interest, long-term loans, such as 
2-percent, 40-year yen loans). Such investments would have a triple win: stimulus 
for the exporting countries; development for the African countries; and 
sustainability as long as we take care to put special emphasis on renewable 
energy, efficient water use, and IT broadband investments which help to 
economize on natural resource demands.  
 
In conclusion, we now have the historic opportunity to rebalance the public 
and the private sectors, and an opportunity to link the short-term macro stimulus 
with the long-term sustainability agenda. This is the kind of counter-recessionary, 
counter-cyclical stimulus that would allow Asia as a whole to maintain high 
growth, improve the environment, confront the challenge of climate change, and 
continue to export to other parts of the world by providing low-interest and long-
term credit. A region that has a large trade surplus, massive foreign exchange 
holdings, low inflation, wonderful technologies, and an almost unlimited need for 
public-sector investments should not see the ongoing global financial crisis as an 
opportunity to invest in the future for long-term wellbeing and sustainability.  
 
